Ấn phẩm:
On the relational dependency coalitional games
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Tóm tắt
In this new model, unlike a simple game, we present the relational dependency coalition game model in which players depend on or do not depend on one another when they share a common interest in achieving a specific goal or outcome. The players must find a minimal winning coalition on which all players of the game depend on achieving the highest payoff. Closure operations and choice functions arise naturally in this game when there is a one-to-one correspondence between the winning coalition/losing coalition and the closure operation/choice function. And the game becomes more complex when relational independence lives with dependency among players. How to have a structural representation of relational independence along with dependency and how to describe a minimal winning collation on a simple hypergraph is also addressed in the paper.
Mô tả
Journal of Computer Science and Cybernetics, Vol. 40, No. 4
Tác giả
Vu, Duc Nghia
Tran, Thanh Dai
Vu, Duc Thi
Janos, Demetrovics
Người hướng dẫn
Nơi xuất bản
Nhà xuất bản
Viện Công nghệ thông tin, Viện Hàn lâm Khoa học và Công nghệ Việt Nam
Năm xuất bản
2024-12
ISSN tạp chí
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Từ khóa chủ đề
Relational dependency coalitional games , Minimal winning coalition , Maximal losing coalition , Closure transversal , Choice transversal , Anti-transversal , Economics
URI
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Vu Duc Nghĩa, Janos Demetrovics, Tran Thanh Dai, Vu Duc Thi.pdf
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