Ấn phẩm:
The political economy of food price volatility: the case of Vietnam and Rice
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This article argues that the structure of the Vietnamese rice export system is, in political economy terms, a rational response to the volatility present in the international rice market. In particular, it is argued that the Vietnamese Food Agency, along with VINAFOOD-1 and VINAFOOD-2, have been structured so that they can benefit from the domestic demands for export restrictions anticipated to occur as a consequence of international price volatility and the psychological demand of consumers for price stability. In turn, the actions of these agencies also contribute to international price volatility and the resulting demand for export restrictions. Since the political and economic elite in Vietnam obtain both political and economic power from this system, it is unlikely to be replaced with more effective and efficient policies to combat domestic price volatility. Thus, continued volatility in the price of rice can be expected.
Tác giả
Fulton, Murray
Reynolds, Travis
Người hướng dẫn
Nơi xuất bản
Nhà xuất bản
Năm xuất bản
2012
ISSN tạp chí
Nhan đề tập
Từ khóa chủ đề
Extractive institutions , Price volatility , Loss aversion , Vietnam
Bộ sưu tập
URI
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Tệp tin
The Political Economy of Food Price Volatility The Case of Vietnam and Rice.pdf
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